A strong answer. “The first thing I'd separate is whether this is a limit problem or a position problem, because ‘raise my limit’ and ‘I have a position I don't want to reduce’ look identical from the outside and need opposite answers.

Then I'd look at how they got to 90%, which matters more than the level. Gradually, as part of a stated strategy, with the risk scaling in line with conviction — that's a reasonable case. Or suddenly, because a position moved against them and the exposure grew passively — that's a trader who is being carried into a larger position by the market rather than choosing one, and raising the limit there is how firms die. It is precisely the pattern in most trading blow-ups: the position was not entered at that size, it grew.

Then the analysis, and I'd want it before any conversation. What does the book actually look like under stress — not a 1-day 99% VaR, which is comfortable and nearly useless for this decision, but a specific scenario. What happens on a gap? Because the number that matters is not the loss at the limit, it's the loss when they cannot exit — and in Indian F&O near expiry, or in any thin instrument, exit liquidity is the binding constraint, not the position size.

Then correlation, which is the one that catches people. If four traders are each at 80% of their individual limits and the positions are correlated, the firm has one big position, not four moderate ones. Individual limits do not aggregate.

And on profitability: being up is not evidence that the risk is appropriate. It is evidence that the risk paid this time. I would say that plainly and without hostility, because the job requires being able to hold that line with someone senior and still work with them tomorrow.

Where I'd land: if the analysis supports it, I'd propose a temporary, conditional increase — a specific size, a specific expiry, a hard loss trigger that reverts it — rather than a permanent limit change. That gives the trader what they need and keeps the constraint real.”